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Pricing and Policy Problems
in the Northeast Fluid Milk Industry

Abstract:

This article documents the need for reform of milk pricing in the Northeast. The
New York price gouging law can be recast as a fair share law. This new milk policy
“kills two birds with one stone.” It corrects regional inequities in raw milk pricing by
reforming the pricing of milk at retail by limiting and redistributing excessive retail
margins to farmers and consumers. The fair share policy relieves allocative price
inefficiency, improves the performance of the federal milk market order pool, and the
general performance of the Northeast dairy farming and fluid milk industries.
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I. Introduction
For dairy farming in any region of the U.S., and especially the Northeast, the core
of the sustainability issue is regional differences in cost of production and prices received
for raw milk. Consumers are always going to drink milk and consume manufactured
dairy products. A critical question is where will that milk be produced? This paper will
not address regional cost of production differences.1 Rather it focuses on regional price
differences, which have been ignored since the demise of the Northeast Dairy Compact in
2001. Moreover, the regional impacts of federal, regional, and state polices, and the
performance of the Northeast fluid milk marketing channel are critical determinants of
the prices that Northeast farmers receive. I will critique the operation of federal milk
market orders, document the demise of competition in fluid milk pricing among
supermarket chains in the Northeast, and analyze two state level fluid channel pricing
policies that can improve price performance. The first is the New York price gouging
law that primarily benefits consumers. The second is a new and as yet untried policy, a
fair share approach that appropriates part of retailer’s margins for payment back to
farmers. This second policy can be fine tuned to reduce retail milk prices as well. It also
reinvigorates federal milk market classified pricing which has been weakened by the
increasing market power of supermarket chains in the Northeast.
II. Regional Farm Milk Price Differences
Let’s start with the issue of farm level milk prices in different parts of the U.S.
As part of the federal market order consolidation process that culminated with the
establishment of eleven market orders in January of 2000, Cornell University researchers
analyzed the location of milk production and milk processing plants for cheese, butter,
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cultured products and fluid products throughout the United States (Pratt, et al. 1998).
Their basic result imitates work done by milk marketing economists on pricing in milk
sheds before the advent of federal milk market orders (e.g., Cassels, 1937). If there were
no federal milk marketing policies and milk were allowed to move in an “open market”
throughout the country, farmers would have different prices for raw milk throughout the
United States.
This basic result comes from the fact that fluid milk, when compared to cream,
butter, and cheese, is bulky and therefore there is an economic advantage to producing it
close to its consumption point. Working in 1934, Cassels explained the pricing and
location of the production of milk for use as fluid, cream, or butter.

“The cost of shipping a given quantity of milk in fluid form being greater
than the cost of shipping its equivalent in the form of cream, it will
naturally be shipped from points nearer to the market than those from
which cream is shipped. Similarly, since the cost of shipping cream is
greater than the cost of shipping its equivalent in the form of butter (or
some other manufactured product), it will tend to come from a zone nearer
the market than that from which the butter comes. Suppose that the cost
per mile of shipping 100 pounds of milk is one cent and the cost of
shipping its equivalent in the form of cream is 1/10 of a cent and its
equivalent in the form of butter is 1/40 of a cent.…If the prices for the
three commodities (in this sense) f.o.b. city were the same, then at all
points in the surrounding territory the farmers would obtain their best
returns from milk used in the manufacture of butter and none would be
available for shipment as either fluid milk or cream. In order that cream
may be obtained, its city price must be higher than that being paid for
butter, and in order that fluid milk may be obtained, its price must be
higher than the price being paid for cream. The differences in the
transportation rates will determine the distances from the market at which
it will become more profitable to ship cream than milk and at which it will
become more profitable to ship butter than cream.” (Cassels, M., pgs. 2021.)
Note that the technical properties of different dairy products and transportation
cost differences dictate that fluid milk will be highest priced and produced closest to the
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consumption point. This result is not the product of federal milk market orders. What
federal orders do is pool proceeds from the sale of all types of products and pay a blended
price to farmers. The blend price paid to a particular farm depends on its distance from a
consumption point, e.g., Boston. Orders insure equitable treatment for farmers, i.e., their
mailbox price does not depend on how their milk is used (fluid, cream, cheese, butter).
Pooling removes the opportunity for milk assemblers/processors to chisel down higher
value product prices by threatening to switch to farmers who sell at lower prices for
cheese or butter. 2
In 1996 Pratt et al., in their base scenario for the U.S. dairy industry, (no market
orders) found that milk at the farm gate would be of most value near locations such as
Miami and Boston, and it would have lesser value in places such as central Wisconsin
and New Mexico. Such low value areas would be the reserve supply areas for fluid milk
and primarily focus on the production of butter and cheese. In this spatial competitive
market scenario farmers located in the Northeast in fact receive a higher price at the farm
gate than farmers in the upper Midwest. This is because farmers in the Northeast would
be producing more of the higher value fluid product because they are close to major
consumption points. Now not all of the Northeast milk in the competitive scenario would
go to fluid. Today approximately 60% goes to cheese, butter, and soft dairy products
such as yogurt. However, more milk in the Northeast than in the areas of reserve supply
goes to fluid.
Today, of course, we do not have open, competitive raw milk markets. However,
Cassels’ classic analyses and the more recent Cornell study serves as a benchmark for
measuring the efficiency and regional equity of our public dairy policies. The basic point
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on regional equity is farmers in different parts of the country should receive different
prices, i.e., farmers in the Northeast and Southeast should receive higher prices than
farmers in areas of reserve supply, i.e., the upper Midwest and West.
But this is not the case. If one examines the mailbox prices received by dairy
farmers in the Northeast and compares those to prices received in Wisconsin, for
example, during 2002 and 2003 Wisconsin farmers received about the same or ten or
fifteen cents per hundredweight more than Northeast dairy farmers.3 Thus during the
2002-3 low raw milk price era when New England farmers were suffering with milk
prices at the farm level around $11 a hundredweight, roughly $4 below the region’s cost
of production for a mid-sized farm (Sciabarassi, 2003), farmers in the upper Midwest
who have a lower cost of production were getting the same or a higher price An
important conclusion follows: The decline in dairy farming in New England and more
generally the Northeast is due to price inequities as well as the commonly acknowledged
higher production costs.
In 2004 the situation was different. Raw milk prices peaked at an all time high,
but the regional imbalance continued. For example, dairy farmers in New England
received a mailbox price in April 2004 of roughly $17.11 a hundredweight, but
Wisconsin dairy farmers received a mailbox price of $19.89 for a hundred pounds, $2.78
per hundredweight more than Northeast dairy farmers. In conclusion, cheese producing
areas do better at both high and low stages of the pricing cycle.4
Historically, at least since the 1960s, the upper Midwest has argued that the fluid
milk marketing orders kept prices high in the Northeast and Southeast regions thereby
encouraging an excess supply of milk, which depressed upper Midwest cheese markets
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(see, for example, Cropp and Jesse, 2003). However, over the past four years
inefficiency and inequity in the opposite direction has occurred.5 Today, we have cheese
market orders, not fluid milk market orders.
Why is this the case? Federal milk market orders, in the first instance, are not the
cause of this change in milk pricing. If one examines Jesse et al. one will see that
agricultural economists in the Midwest as well as in the Northeast and elsewhere pretty
much agree that federal milk marketing orders have been relaxed to the point that they do
not price discriminate on a regional basis to benefit areas with higher Class 1 fluid use.
In fact federal market orders no longer are the primary or binding factor that determine
fluid milk prices (Novakovic, 2004a, 2004b).
Although the Federal Milk Market Orders do enhance the orderly marketing of
milk by monitoring processor payments and by operating the federal order pool payment
system, the very concentrated raw milk assembly, processing, and retailing segments of
the milk-marketing channel have replaced the federal orders as the governor of raw fluid
milk prices. In the current relaxed regulatory environment fluid milk prices are
determined by over-order premiums that cooperatives negotiate and the handler
premiums paid to independent producers. The bargaining power of large supermarket
chains and processors drives these premiums more than the power of milk assembly
cooperatives. Cooperatives in various parts of the country on certain occasions extract
premiums on both fluid and cheese market milk. However, today cooperative power and
premiums are limited by the free rider problem just as they were during the 1920’s.
Processors can make it attractive for farms to defect from a bargaining unit.

7

As I testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee (October 2003) in this
relaxed regulatory environment the major determinants of the documented regional
inefficiency and inequity in milk pricing has to be the differential power of cooperatives,
processors, and retailers in different regions of the country (Cotterill, et al., 2003).
Consequently, the bargaining for milk prices has taken the path that we’ve observed with
inverted regional price differences or price differences below the cost of transportation
between reserve supply areas such as the upper Midwest and the Northeast. As shown
above inverted farm level milk prices that existed at both the recent low and high points
of the price cycle would not exist in this relaxed federal order market era if regional
markets were competitive and all states had uniform policies towards the dairy industry.
When cheese milk prices increase, one would think that over-order premiums for
fluid milk would also increase thereby preserving the normal pricing relationship, i.e.,
higher prices for milk used as fluid. Alternatively, farmers or their cooperatives would
divert fluid milk to the cheese market until processors and retailers paid a higher price for
fluid. The fact that this has not happened indicates the bargaining power that retailers
and fluid processors have in the current market channel structure.
During 2004 and 2005, dairy farmers in the Northeast and elsewhere in the United
States enjoyed very high prices and nearly all earned a positive return on their
investment. Nonetheless, regional pricing imbalances that are caused by differential
bargaining power are extremely important for the long run evolution of the industry. The
documented regional imbalance in pricing, in combination with the regional differences
in cost of production, does not auger well for New England and Northeast dairy farmers.
As milk prices go down in 2006, Midwestern and Western farmers have more staying
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power for the long haul relative to Northeast farmers because they had much larger
profits than the fluid area farmers during the recent “cheese market bonanza”. 6
III. Fluid Market Channel Pricing Problems in the Northeast.
Dairy policy has traditionally focused only on raw milk prices, and interregional
pricing issues have primarily been addressed through the federal milk market order
program. Since its inception in the 1930’s the milk market order program has essentially
assumed that fluid milk marketing channels are competitive. Yet this is no longer the
case, and, as explained in this section, private pricing power in the fluid channel now saps
the ability of order classified pricing to increase the farm pay price (blend price) for milk.
Turning now to analysis of the fluid marketing channel in New England and New
York, one has solid evidence that retailers have and exercise substantial market power in
the fluid milk channel. Figure 1 provides the federal market orders monthly retail prices
for Hartford and the corresponding announced Class 1 or Compact (during the Compact
era) raw milk prices from January 1996 to June 2006.7 In 1996, the difference between
retail and farm prices was approximately $1.00. Ten years later the retail farm price
spread is twice that, $2.00 per gallon. The “Hartford price spread” line in Figure 1
documents that the gap has increased over time with a very large discrete leap when farm
prices plummeted after the demise of the Dairy Compact.8 Since farm prices have not
increased, the processor and retailer share of the consumer’s dollar spent on milk has
increased from roughly 40% in 1996 to 57% in 2006.
Figure 2 breaks down retail prices into retail, processing, and farm components by
brand and supermarket chain for March 2003. Dairy Technomics, a firm that routinely
estimates processing and distribution costs by brand for supermarket chain buyers,
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provided estimates which allow us to determine delivered wholesale prices. Note that the
region’s dominant chain, Stop and Shop, has negotiated the lowest processing cost for
Garelick milk and its private label milk which is provided by Garelick, 52.5 cents per
gallon compared to Garelick’s 61.5 cents per gallon margin received from Shaws and
A&P.9 Guida’s private label and brand milk to Big Y has an even higher margin, 65.8
cents.
Note also in Figure 2 that the retailers routinely capture the largest share of the
consumer’s milk dollar. Criner (2003) and others estimate that the supermarkets fully
allocated cost plus a competitive rate of return for gallons of milk is between 40 and 50
cents. Therefore, in March 2003 when raw milk prices were in a trough the retailer’s
excess net profit, at roughly $1.00 per gallon, equaled the price that farmers received for
the raw milk that was bottled. This stratospheric super competitive profit margin
documents the market power of the supermarket chains. 10
Figure 2 also documents a very interesting and important fact. Branded milk
processors capture only a very small portion of the brand premium that consumer’s pay.
Retailers, who have no involvement in developing brands, capture nearly all of the
Garelick and Hood brand premiums. Again, one has strong evidence of retailer market
power.
Table 1 reports retail prices for different types of milk in Connecticut
supermarkets during November 2005. For each type of milk in a supermarket the price is
a weighted average across brands. Note that in A&P/Waldbaums all brands of milk are
flat priced across types. Thus the average price for whole milk is identical to the average
prices of 2%, 1%, and skim, and the price is $3.75 per gallon. All of the other
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supermarket chains except Wal-Mart effectively charge the same price for milk with
varying butterfat content. The Class 1 raw milk price in Table 1 indicates that raw skim
milk is 13 cents cheaper than 1%, 28 cents cheaper than 2% and 47 cents per gallon
cheaper than whole milk. Flat milk pricing across milk types is yet another indicator of
supermarket chain pricing power. In a competitive market retail prices would tend to
follow raw milk prices. Only Wal-Mart pricing appears to reflect costs.
This documented exercise of market power by retailers is destroying the
economic basis and power of milk market orders that seek to capture the value of fluid
milk sales to increase pooled payments to farmers. As retailers, and possibly processors,
with market power elevate milk prices, the demand for milk becomes more elastic. This
means that a given percent increase in price yields a lower increase in total revenue for
fluid milk in the pool. When the “yield” from the classified pricing of fluid milk
decreases, the blend price paid farmers decreases. If market power continues to increase
to tight oligopoly or monopoly levels retail prices may move so high that we have elastic
market demand.11 Then the Class 1 price discrimination scheme of the federal orders
reduces rather than increases the blend price that farmers receive. This is because when
demand is elastic a price increase actually reduces fluid revenues. At that point private
economic power completely destroys the classified pricing system of the milk market
orders.
IV. Policy Options
Turning now to policy, current traditional dairy policy does not address regional
pricing problems. National policies, such as the Federal Milk Income Loss Contract, and
the cooperative CWT Program do shore up the national price; however, they do nothing
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to redress the regional imbalance in pricing. In fact, the Milk Income Loss Contract
Program covers more of Wisconsin’s smaller dairy farms than our larger dairy farmers in
New York and New England.
If either of these programs were benchmarked to cover the higher cost of
production in New England and applied equally across the entire country, New England
farmers would be making money, but farmers elsewhere would be making huge amounts
of money and would expand supply in such a fashion as to totally blow those programs
away. Any national policy that encourages or abets the same raw milk price for all
farmers ignores the economic need for different price levels in different regions of the
nation.
One could provide relief to the Northeast if one revised the Class I differentials in
the federal milk market orders to create a higher fluid price in the Northeast. There is
some talk of this in 2006 as Congress moves towards a new farm bill (Robert Gray). This
option, however, faces a host of opponents in Congress from other regions. Class I
differentials have not changed in over 25 years. At Boston one adds $3.25/cwt to the Eau
Claire, Wisconsin base (manufacturing milk) price. This is only $1.55 cwt more than the
differential added for fluid milk at Eau Claire. Given that it currently costs around 61
cents to move a 100 pounds of raw milk a hundred miles the federal order fluid
differential between the Midwest and the Northeast is definitely too low to influence
regional prices.
What does the rise of private pricing power in the dairy marketing channel
suggest for dairy policy? Curiously it predicts that product differentiation (new product
development), may take dairy farmers down the ready to eat breakfast cereal path. Wheat
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farmers have gained little or nothing from the proliferation of cereal brands. Branded
product manufacturers and retailers seek to maximize profits not sales volume. This
implies that the output restriction effect of market power can offset the increase in
consumer demand due to increased variety. The push to provide new “high value”
differentiated dairy products and the subsidy of such by dairy farmers may very well not
benefit farmers. At a minimum most of the benefits will stay with processors and
retailers.
Antitrust enforcement that prevents further consolidation in milk processing and
in supermarket retailing is a good idea. But in many regions shutting this door does no
good because the horse is already out of the barn. Recently, in Chicago, a consumer class
action lawsuit against the dominant supermarket chains, Jewel and Dominick’s failed
because the price leadership scheme they use is not price fixing. Jewel sets a high price.
Dominick’s and others match that price. Since no one talks (conspires) with others to set
the price, their conduct is legal (Zimmermann 2003).
When markets are not competitive and antitrust is ineffective, economists look to
regulation to improve economic performance. During the deep raw milk price trough in
1989 and the early 1990’s New York legislators passed two related milk price regulation
laws. The Rogers Allen law that empowers the state to regulate raw milk prices was
strengthened. It briefly served as a basis for fluid milk price elevation to provide farmers
relief from low prices; however, the implemented over-order pricing system was
challenged and found to be in violation of the interstate commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution. When this farm oriented law was strengthened, a price gouging law also
passed in a log rolling compromise for down state support. The New York price gouging
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law has continued to operate. The law limits the retail price to no more than 200% of the
raw milk price processors pay.
Figure 3 reports milk prices for New York and New England. Retail prices, on
average, in New York are lower than in New England. Note that the price gouging law
tends to be most effective (binding) when raw milk prices are low. During low raw milk
price periods, New York prices are much lower than New England prices where there is
no price gouging law.12
One way forward for milk pricing reform in the Northeast is to renew a focus on
state level policies. State level bargaining or mandated over-order premiums in the
Northeast have been tried in the past. As briefly explained when discussing the New
York Rogers Allen law the approach was not successful for legal reasons. Also from the
economic standpoint if one assembles 95% of the Northeast farmers into a bargaining
unit and bargains for an over-order price, processors can defeat these over-order
premiums movement by shifting their business to the 5% that don’t participate and
attracting others to defect from the bargaining unit. This free rider problem exists
because of the difference between the Class I price that a processor pays for the milk,
which includes the over-order premium, and the blend price that all farmers receive when
such premiums are blended back across manufacturing as well as fluid milk. The
processor can split the difference between the bargained fluid price and the blend price
with someone outside the bargaining unit. Both are better are off. Ultimately, the
bargaining effort collapses.
There needs to be a new way to redistribute revenue in the milk-marketing
channel from powerful retailers to farmers and consumers. A policy that reduces retailer
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market power would also help to reinvigorate the federal orders pool pricing as a vehicle
for higher farm milk prices. A new state level policy also needs to avoid the free rider
problem inherent in elevating raw milk price in a particular state or region. The new
policy must also not violate the interstate commerce clause which prohibits states from
impeding the flow of commerce in the nation, i.e. it must not discriminate between in
state and out of state farmers and processors that supply the states fluid milk needs.
Consider a fair share price policy that returns a portion of the retail margin to
farmers. Under a fair share approach one could set the following policy parameters.
Retailers would be permitted to mark fluid milk up 20%, and after that half of any
additional mark up would be shared with the farmer. This money would be paid back
into a pool that would include all the farmers that supply the milk to that particular
retailer.
Note that there is no free rider problem in this milk pricing policy. All retailers
pay. They cannot avoid paying by switching to a different fluid milk processor or a
different set of farmers that supply that processor. Also the Connecticut Attorney
General has ruled that a price collar approach that is similar to this fair share approach
does not violate the interstate commerce clause. Thus the fair share approach is a legal
milk pricing policy that a state can implement. This is the case because it does not
discriminate between milk supplied by farmers and/or processors from instate and out of
state.13
Note that the fair share has no impact on the fluid milk processing industry. A
fluid milk processor continues to pay a price for milk as determined currently and
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continues to sell to supermarkets based upon market conditions as they do now. The only
difference is that a retailer must share part of any markup over 20% with farmers.
How would a fair share policy effect consumers? The share ratio can then be
manipulated in such a fashion that one can determine a distribution to farmers, a residual
amount remaining to retailers, and confer a certain benefit to consumers as well. In other
words this milk pricing regulatory policy could benefit farmers, processors and
consumers with a more equitable distribution of the proceeds from the milk production
and distribution activity. A fair share policy could be managed by a regulatory board that
represents all parties, such as the Connecticut Milk Regulation Board.
Consider the following example. A state’s milk regulation board determines that
the paid raw milk fluid price should be no lower than $17.00/cwt for 3.5% butter fat milk.
It decides that retailers will keep the first 20% of their markup over wholesale price, that
they will pay a certain “fair share” of markups beyond 20% to farmers, and that mark ups
be capped at 50%. Note that if the raw price is at or above $17.00/cwt the fair share rate
is zero; however, the 50% markup cap persists. The law is similar to the New York price
gouging law. However, when farm prices are low the fair share law returns money to
farmers.
Table 2 illustrates how the fair share policy could work. From February through
June 2006 Class I raw milk prices at Boston dropped from $18.28 to $15.65 per hundred
weight (cwt) for 3.5% butter fat milk. April 2003 is also in the table so that one can see
how the policy could work at an even lower Class I price, $14.42 per cwt. Section 2 of
the Table gives the raw milk prices per gallon for each type of milk for each month. The
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price of skim milk, for example, falls from $1.17 per gallon in February 2006 to .$94 per
gallon in the lowest priced month, April 2003.
Section 3 of Table 2 gives the corresponding wholesale prices for each type of
milk. One obtains wholesale prices by adding Dairy Technomics August 2005 estimate
for private label milk processing and distribution to raw milk prices (Durling, 2005).
Any retailer complying with the policy and the regulatory agency would need only the
delivered wholesale prices which are readily available. In this example the average
wholesale price for all types of milk ranges from $2.11 per gallon in February 2006, the
highest price month, to $1.84 per gallon in the lowest price month. Although this
example ignores brand level differences, a markup rule based on delivered wholesale
prices can accommodate them and would therefore limit retailer’s capture of processor’s
brand equity.
Section 4 computes the 20% retail trigger price. Prices above this require the
retailer to pay into the fair share fund if farm prices are below $17.00.
Section 5 computes the retail ceiling prices at 50% markup for each month.
Section 6 gives the actual (current) price for each month. Note that the actual price in
every month is above the policy ceiling price so retailers need to cut price. Consumers’
savings range from 29 cents in February 2006, the highest priced month, to 23 cents per
gallon in the lowest priced month.
Section 7 analyzes farmer benefits. During February and March 2006 raw milk
prices are above $17.00/cwt, so the fair share ratio is zero. Farmers receive no benefit.
In April 2006 prices are below $17.00 and the program kicks in with a 17% share ratio.
This pays 9 cents per gallon and restores the raw price to $1.46 per gallon ($17.00/cwt).
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As the price drops in the other months in Table 2 the fair share ratio goes up to 44% and
program payments per gallon go up to 24 cents to keep farmers at the $17.00 raw price.
Section 8 illustrates the impact of the policy on supermarkets. This policy
reduces their “net of payments to farmers” price. Their realized gross margin ranges are
from 33% to 27%. Their dollar gross margins range from $1.03 to $.68 per gallon. Note
that these realized gross margins are well above the 40-50 cents that Criner and others
have estimated are sufficient to cover all costs including a competitive return to equity
capital.
This regulatory policy could require that supermarkets pay fair share monies to
the processors who supply their milk. Processors in turn would return monies to the
cooperatives that supply them, most notably Dairy Marketing Services and Agri-Mark.
The cooperatives would then devise a payout schedule, possibly a straight prorate share
based on the volume of milk supplied by each farmer. Note that if only one state, for
example Connecticut, enacts this law the fair share payment would be diluted over all
farmers that supplied milk to a plant that also supplies New York, Massachusetts and
possibly other states. However, if all states supplied by that plant had a fair share law
there would be no dilution.
What if one does not do some sort of regional milk policy along these lines?
Would consumers, in fact, benefit from lower priced milk from the Midwest and the far
West? This is an excellent question, however, the answer is clearly they would not. Yes,
the cost of production in the Northeast is higher than those more distant areas; however,
in Spring 2006 it cost approximately 61 cents to transport a hundredweight of raw milk a
hundred miles. This means that transporting fluid milk from very distant areas tends to
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generate very expensive milk. Also, as we have seen under the existing policies the mail
box prices are not lower in the upper Midwest, they are higher or at best roughly equal to
the Northeast over the dairy pricing cycle. The disappearance of production and
processing here would only put them in a stronger supply situation, i.e., elevate delivered
prices in the Northeast. Adding transportation costs to either fluid or processed products
for shipping east also creates higher consumer prices in the Northeast.
V. Conclusions
This analysis suggests that there is a need for reform of milk pricing in the
Northeast. The New York price gouging law needs to be recast as a fair share law. This
reform benefits farmers and processors as well as consumers. It enhances the survival of
Northeast dairy farmers and the region’s dairy processing industry.
The fair share policy could be implemented even if there were competitive pricing
in the retail milk-marketing channel in our region. The cold hard fact, however, is that
we do not have competitive retail milk pricing in New England. . Thus the milk policy
outlined here “kills two birds with one stone.” It not only addresses the regional raw
milk pricing issue where farmers need relief, it also reforms the pricing of milk at retail
by limiting and redistributing excessive margins. Clearly the economic viability of
Northeast dairy farms depends importantly on state level action. Milk pricing reform at
the state level deserves attention. It can improve the performance of the dairy and fluid
milk industries.
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Figure 1. Hartford
Market Level Retail and Farm Fluid Milk Price
January 1996 - June 2006
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Source : Data from Order One Market Administrator and Dairy Market News.
Note : Vertical lines indicate beginning (7/97) and end (9/01) of Northeast Dairy Compact.
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Hartford Retail
Hartford Compact/Class 1
Hartford Retail Farm Price Spread

Figure 2. Actual Raw Milk, Estimated Wholesale, and Actual Retail Milk Pricing by Brand for the Four
Leading Supermarket Chains in Southern New England: March 2003
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Prices are the average across Whole, 2%, 1%, and Skim Milk and include all sales or promotional prices.
Wholesale $ Margin, from Dairy Technomics, includes Market Administrator Fee, Processor Assesment, and 1% Plant Loss.

24

A&P
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Raw Milk Price

Figure 3. Weighted Average Chain Store 3.25% Whole Milk Prices
in New York and New England and Repsective 3.5% Whole Raw Milk Prices
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Source: Raw milk data from Order One Market Administrator and Dairy Market News. Whole
Chain prices in New England and New York from survey's completed by the Food Marketing
Policy Center.

Ju
l

ay

ar
M

'04
Ja
n

ov
N

t
Se
p

Ju
l

ay
M

ar
M

'03
Ja
n

N

ov

0.00

Table 1. Weighted Average Price of Gallon Fluid Milk in CT by Chain: November 2005
Store Name
Whole
2%
1%
Skim
No of Stores
A & P/Waldbaums
Big Y
Shaw's/Star Market
Shop Rite
Stop & Shop
Wal-Mart Supercenter

$3.75
$3.55
$3.69
$3.88
$3.88
$3.32

$3.75
$3.50
$3.69
$3.85
$3.87
$3.04

$3.75
$3.50
$3.68
$3.83
$3.86
$2.87

$3.75
$3.45
$3.68
$3.80
$3.84
$2.71

Class 1 Raw Milk

$1.51

$1.32

$1.17

$1.04
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3
8
7
6
15
2

Table 2. An Example of the Fair Share Approach to Milk Price Regulation:
Basic Rule: $0.76 markup to wholesale, 20% markup to retail trigger price, 50% markup to retail
ceiling price, and a progressive share ratio to establish a raw fluid price floor at $17.00 per
hundredweight.
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Apr
2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2003
1. Components of Class 1 Price
Class 1 Skim Price
Class 1 Butterfat Price
Coop Premium
Assessments
Class 1 3.5% Price
2. Per Gallon Prices
Whole (3.25%)
2%
1%
Skim

11.66
1.51
1.50
0.25
18.28

11.10 10.17
1.41 1.30
1.50 1.50
0.25 0.25
17.39 16.12

10.05 9.72 9.07
1.26 1.29 1.15
1.50 1.50 1.40
0.25 0.25 0.23
15.87 15.65 14.42

1.54
1.40
1.28
1.17

1.47
1.33
1.22
1.12

1.36
1.23
1.13
1.04

1.34
1.22
1.12
1.03

1.32
1.19
1.09
1.00

1.23
1.12
1.02
0.94

Average Raw Milk Price

1.35

1.28

1.19

1.18

1.15

1.08

3. Processor Dollar Markup

0.76

0.76

0.76

0.76

0.76

0.76

Wholesale Prices Per Gallon
Whole (3.25%)
2%
1%
Skim

2.30
2.16
2.04
1.93

2.23
2.09
1.98
1.88

2.12
1.99
1.89
1.80

2.10
1.98
1.88
1.79

2.08
1.95
1.85
1.76

1.99
1.88
1.78
1.70

Average Wholesale Price

2.11

2.04

1.95

1.94

1.91

1.84

4. Retail Trigger Price Markup
Dollar Trigger Markup

20%
0.42

20%
0.41

20%
0.39

20%
0.39

20%
0.38

20%
0.37

Trigger Prices Per Gallon
Whole (3.25%)
2%
1%
Skim

2.72
2.58
2.46
2.35

2.64
2.50
2.39
2.29

2.51
2.38
2.28
2.19

2.49
2.36
2.26
2.18

2.46
2.34
2.23
2.14

2.35
2.24
2.15
2.07

Average Trigger Price

2.53

2.45

2.34

2.32

2.29 2.20
(continues)

Table 2. (continued)
Feb
2006
50%
1.05

Mar
2006
50%
1.02

Apr
2006
50%
0.98

May
2006
50%
0.97

Jun
2006
50%
0.96

Apr
2003
50%
0.92

Retail Ceiling Prices Per Gallon
Whole (3.25%)
2%
1%
Skim

3.35
3.21
3.09
2.98

3.25
3.11
3.00
2.90

3.10
2.97
2.87
2.77

3.07
2.95
2.84
2.76

3.04
2.91
2.81
2.72

2.91
2.79
2.70
2.62

Average Ceiling Price

3.16

3.07

2.93

2.90

2.87

2.76

3.45

3.44

3.30

2.97

2.97

2.99

0.29

0.37

0.37

0.07

0.10

0.23

0%
0.00
1.55
1.55

0%
0.00
1.47
1.47

16%
0.10
1.37
1.46

20%
0.12
1.34
1.46

24%
0.14
1.32
1.46

44%
0.24
1.22
1.46

5. Retail Ceiling Price Markup
Dollar Ceiling Markup

6. Current Price1
Consumer Savings
7. Farmer
Share Ratio
Program Payment Per Gallon
Raw Fluid Price @ 3.5%*
Total Fluid Price Per Gallon
Raw Fluid Price Per Hundredweight @ 3.5%
Program Payment Per Hundredweight
Total Raw Fluid Price Per Hundredweight
8. Supermarket
Average Price Net of Farm Payment
Percent Gross Margin
Dollar Gross Margin

18.03
0.00
18.03

3.16
33%
1.05

17.14 15.87
0.00 1.12
17.14 17.00

3.07
33%
1.02

2.83
31%
0.88

15.62 15.40 14.19
1.38 1.59 2.81
17.00 17.00 17.00

2.78
30%
0.85

2.73
30%
0.82

2.51
27%
0.68

* Raw Fluid Price @3.5% does not include the 0.245 Processor and Administrative Assessment
(0.23 in April 03).
1

Current Price from Federal Milk Order No. 1 monthly retail survey for Whole milk in Hartford,
CT. June 06 is May 06 price.
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Endnotes
1

See Jesse (2003). The focus on pricing does not imply that cost of production differences are unimportant

when addressing dairy policy issues. Clearly they are a major force driving structural change in the
location and size of dairy farms. Nonetheless the price that farmers receive for their milk is also important.
2

The classified pricing of federal orders is often seen as a government sanctioned cartel that uses price

discrimination to extract more money from fluid milk buyers and then pool the proceeds to pay a common
“blend” price to all farmers in the order. As this quote from Cassels shows, this is not true if orders are
relaxed to a “competitive” setting as they are today. Earlier orders were tightly set to enact price
discrimination that benefited fluid producers near large urban markets.
3

One can find mailbox prices by going to the April issue of Dairy Market News at

http://www.ams.usda.gov/DAIRY/mncs/.
4

Depooling of milk occurred during the most recent cheese price run up, but it does not affect this

interregional analysis. Depooling in a market order such as the Northeast or upper Midwest does not affect
the total average price received for raw milk sales. It does, however, benefit farmers that supply cheese
milk at the expense of farmers that supply fluid milk and remain in the pool. For example, Robert
Wellington, Agri-mark Economist, explained at the 2005 Litchfield County late summer picnic that AgriMark depooled cheese milk and blended it over its members to raise their price 20 cents per
hundredweight. Agri-Mark’s action decreased the blend price 5 cents per hundredweight.
DMS/Dairylea/St. Albans also depooled milk and depressed the orders blend price. Independent farmers
not in those cooperatives could not depool and thus received only the depressed blend price. Depooling has
even greater equity consequences in cheese milk areas of the country.
5

Current market performance is inefficient and inequitable when compared to the competitive market

norm.
6

Major dairy states, such as California and Wisconsin, clearly take care of their farms. Increasingly

“fringe area” states such as in New England and the Southeast are moving to do so as well. Go to the
Maine Milk Commission website to learn of their recent price subsidy program that is tailored to benefit

smaller farmers most. The states of Connecticut and Vermont appropriated 2 and 8 million dollars
respectively in 2006 to subsidize dairy farm income.
7

Cooperative premiums during the non-Compact era would raise the raw price slightly; however, the

analysis of margins remain the same.
8

The Northeast Dairy Compact was attacked as a cartel that if eliminated would result in lower prices to

consumers. The fluid milk processors through their trade group, the International Dairy Food Association,
and the supermarket chains, through the Food Marketing Institute, aggressively pushed this viewpoint in
Washington and more recently in the state houses in New England. In fact, soon after the Dairy Compact’s
demise raw milk prices plummeted 50 cents per gallon. According to the IDFA economist’s model, retail
prices should have dropped 90 cents per gallon in New England. They dropped only 10 cents. Private
power not competition replaced public power.
9

Stop and Shop closed its own milk plant in 2000 after negotiating a 20 year supply contract with Dean

Foods (Garelick). Stop and Shop used the plant as a bargaining chip to extort a very favorable price from
Dean.
10

See Cotterill (2004) for similar breakdowns for June 2003 and October 2003.

11

It is a theorem in economics that a profit maximizing firm always prices on the elastic portion of its firm

or brand level demand curve.
12

See Huff (2003) for a detailed explanation of the New York laws operation.

13

See the opinion letter from Richard Blumenthal, Connecticut Attorney General, at www.fmpc.uconn.edu.

Click on “milk pricing” and scroll down.
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